ABSTRACT Traditionally, network risk assessment uses a statistical computation method. This paper proposes Lie group kinematics to describe the feature space of the attack behavior. A matrix composed of indicators and topologies in a network system is mapped to a Lie group. The attack behavior path and the powers of the attack and defense are defined. The risk value of the attack and defense is calculated from the change in the indicators. Then, we evaluate the network security risk status using calculus. To examine the validity of the network risk assessment based on a Lie group, we conduct one experiment and utilize the CIC2017 dataset to show the applicability and efficiency of the proposed method. The experimental results show the effectiveness of the calculation method based on a Lie group, and the risk value of the attack and defense is valid compared to those of other machine learning algorithms. The calculation method based on a Lie group can quantitatively analyze network security risks.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
In recent years, the Internet has made considerable progress. However, network attacks are also relentless. Cybercrime is causing major losses to countries, businesses and organizations. On October 21, 2016, Dyn, which provides domain name resolution services for many US companies, was attacked by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, which affected the business of many well-known sellers, such as Twitter, Github, and CNN. On May 13, 2017, ransomware triggered a global hacking incident. The extortion trojan is part of a new family named WannaCry. After a long-range attack of the 445 Windows port, it enters the intranet, and the infection spreads. The virus infected the National Health Service (NHS), and more than 40 medical institutions have been compromised to date. If the NHS risk had been identified in a timely manner and the Microsoft patch was updated in March 2017, the attack would not have occurred. Network risk assessment can measure the risk of a network in real time. This assessment can help organization leaders increase network defenses in time to avoid losses.
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B. MOTIVATION
The method for resolving network security problems is to understand the existing vulnerabilities and threats from information assets. The attack path is determined by the economic ability of the attacker and the defender. We can predict the harm in the attack and prevent the spread of damages by assessing the size of this power and the current state of the path. Therefore, we need to describe the cyberattack behavior and the attack and defense abilities.
For the security risk assessment of a network, it is necessary to evaluate the harm in the attack and the defense power of the network. The method of assessment is based on offensive and defensive methods. In the published literature, the models mentioned in domestic and foreign publications for calculating attack and defense utility are mainly the following.
C. RELATED WORK
Some studies [1] - [3] proposed a method based on offensive and defensive confrontation games. Most of these methods have problems with state explosion. If networks have many nodes, there are many ways that security can be affected. Ghosh and Ghosh [4] proposed a planner-based approach to make and analyze a minimal attack graph, which is a special-purpose search algorithm from an artificial intelligence domain that increases the time efficiency, to measure the network risk. Lian et al. [5] introduced the network security dynamic assessment method based on attack and defense confrontation. With this approach, network security can be measured in real time. Moreover, offensive and defensive processes can be visualized. However, the data processing of the visualization is simple, and the result is biased. Lu et al. [6] built a utility function for risk management to identify the value of information security investment. Wu et al. [7] proposed a dynamic assessment method based on the network threat. The method is a multi-information fusion approach that includes the network environment, attack behavior, vulnerability and protection measures. The authors built an attack state transition map and predicted the attack goal and the chance of attack success. However, their method mainly assesses the vulnerability of the network and does not consider unknown vulnerabilities and other types of attacks.
Evaluating attack modeling based on complex networks is a method by which to evaluate network risk. The network is complex, and the models are built according to the characteristics of the network. The risk is assessed according to the vulnerabilities between nodes, and a probabilistic evaluation of network threats is calculated by fuzzy reliability. Therefore, the vulnerabilities in the network are found, and the harm caused by the attack can be evaluated using the model in [8] and [9] . The advantage of this method is that it describes the complex characteristics of the network. The method applies an offensive and defensive model to obtain the overall safety factor. The disadvantage is that it describes only the connectivity characteristics of the network and does not measure the overall network from other angles. Furthermore, the approach is one-sided and can give only a fuzzy result. Cai et al. [10] proposed an information security Bayesian network evaluation method based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in a patent. However, the method needs to set many features, some of which are subjective, so the objectivity of the evaluation is poor.
In addition, researchers measured network risk using the AHP and fuzzy theory [11] , but the subjectivity of the AHP is stronger. Shepard et al. [12] introduced the network security assessment software CycSecure, which is based on the prior knowledge of artificial intelligence technology, to measure cyber risks. However, the software runs too long for large quantities of data. A multilayered hierarchical Bayesian network method was used in [13] to measure mobile phone security by describing risk communications and potential risk mining. However, this method describes only the connections between mobile applications and does not extend to the entire network, as proposed in [14] - [17] for Bayesian network-associated risk events.
Pendleton et al. [18] proposed system-level security metrics to discuss how they are related. The metrics are relatively complete, but they do not propose a specific method. Kordy et al. [19] described the definitions of attack and defense and summarized the directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based techniques for attack and defense. Hong et al. [20] presented graphical security models (GrSMs) for evaluating network security. This survey compares the performance of GrSMs based on their scalability and modifiability. Moreover, this survey describes problems with GrSMs, including scalability and reusability. Therefore, GrSMs have limits in evaluating network security. Ramos et al. [21] presented deep surveys of network security metrics (NSMs) and discussed their advantages and disadvantages. The surveys presented the most methods for evaluating network security, and we propose our method based on these four surveys.
A differential manifold [22] is used to describe small changes and plays an important role in image processing [23] , [24] , signal processing [25] and machine learning. Zlotnik and Forbes [26] promoted a state estimate of the gradient of an invariant cost function based on the tangent space of a Lie group. Yang et al. [27] proposed a Lie group classification model, achieved good results and made great progress. Chen and Li [28] introduced a Lie group learning subspace orbit in machine learning. In the network, the attack sequence can also be regarded as a mathematics track, so a Lie group can also be used to describe the attack path of the network. Gao et al. [29] proposed Lie group kernel learning for classifying datasets in high-dimensional space. The network can also collect multiple indicators and build a high-dimensional space. If the security state of the network is divided into different types of low-and high-dimensional spaces, network security measures can be realized using the method of Lie group kernel learning. Differential manifolds were applied to the attack and defense calculation of the network, and the definitions of ideas were proposed [30] , thereby constituting the foundation for applying differential manifolds in network security assessments.
The proposed method is summarized below and shown in table 1.
In comparison with other evaluation methods, the Lie group method is a more objective method. It combines static methods and dynamic methods. A Lie group's differential motion feature describes the path of network attack behavior in physical space and better limits the network's attacks and defense confrontation description. In this paper, the network is mapped to a Lie group structure, which more accurately depicts the dynamic state of a network attack by upgrading the network state index change value. We evaluate attacks and defenses by investigating the utility and distance of near nodes in the flow graph. In this paper, the availability, connectivity and reliability of the network are considered through selected indicators, and thus, the risk assessment is more comprehensive and objective. In addition, the data processing in this paper is dimensionless and suitable for different environments. This approach represents one way to set different attack and defense utilities for calculating various offensive and defensive states in networks.
In summary, a Lie group has good performance in representation and feature classification. A Lie group has a [31] based on this method prior to writing this article.
D. CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) Constructing a semantic algebraic model of network systems; 2) Establishing a Lie group differential manifold model based on the semantic model; 3) Calculating network utility using the dynamic changes of indicators and an attack-defense function.
E. ARTICLE STRUCTURE
The structure of this paper is as shown in figure 1 . Section 1 mainly includes background introductions and related work. Section 2 discusses related ideas within a Lie group and network. Section 3 mainly describes the semantic understanding of the network and the modeling of a Lie group, as well as the utility calculation. Section 4 mainly describes the experimental proof. Section 5 describes the evaluation of the experiment and the summary of the paper.
II. ATTACK AND DEFENSE PROCESS OF THE NETWORK SYSTEM BASED ON A LIE GROUP

Scenario
There is a network consisting of multiple servers and other devices that has a defense function, including a firewall and antivirus software. A hacker, who has many attack tools and is interested in the assets in the network, is outside the network. The hacker exploits the vulnerabilities to launch an attack to gain this asset. How does the network risk change in the attack?
During the attack, indicators and their ratios change within the network. Determining how to use these indicators to measure the network risk value is an urgent task.
The first step is to build a model of the attack and the network defenses. Next, the effectiveness of the offensive and defensive processes should be calculated.
A. THE NECESSITY OF A LIE GROUP
A Lie group is a continuous group. It is mainly used in mathematics and physics to describe a continuous transformation. In this paper, we also use a Lie group to describe the transformation of risk in high-dimensional space. We calculate the cumulative risk on the path.
As a differential transformation group, a Lie group [22] has the property of maintaining the smooth structure of the group. Data can be described by the geometric properties of differential manifolds in a network. The algebraic properties of groups can provide specific solutions. Lie groups can describe the transforming network security state. The metrics in the network are mapped to high-dimensional space because the Euclidean distance and cosine likeness often fail in high-dimensional space. The Euclidean distance is too large when the cosine metric is vertical. Therefore, it is necessary to select the optimal measurement function to measure a Lie group.
In addition, there are many similarities between the network and a Lie group. The specific details can be seen in table 2. Homomorphic mapping is introduced in figure 2 .
Variable x represents the element in the set of the network and is called the indicator. U(x) is the utility function, which is the map of x in the network system. In a Lie group, the variable y is the mapping of x, and there is a mapping function U' between y. The left side of the equation shows the blue lines in figure 2 . The right side of the figure indicates the green lines. If the formula is satisfied, there is a homomorphic mapping between the network and the Lie group, which means that a Lie group can map the relationship between elements in the network.
B. NOTATION AND LIE GROUP REPRESENTATION
The network system is presented in a graph. The following notations are used throughout the paper unless otherwise specified (as shown in table 3).
A Lie group is a special group structure. Lie group G not only satisfies the characteristics of the group but is also a differential manifold. Group operations with inverse operations are differentiable. Therefore, Lie group G can be used to characterize continuous and smooth cyberspace state transitions. The tangent spaces T e G formed in the G unit cell e of the Lie group make up a vector space called a Lie algebra g.
Mathematically, a Lie group is a group and differential manifold with the property of maintaining a smooth structure of group operations.
Definition 1 (Lie group): Let G be a nonempty set if: 1) G is a group; 2) G is a differential manifold; 3) group operations can be slightly different, and the map
is a differential map. Then, the Lie group is G.
Lemma 1: (The rotation transformation group is a Lie group):
There is a rotation transform on the plane R 2 , and it transforms x = (x 1 , x 2 ) to y = (y 1 , y 2 ) and shows that: as A(ϕ) = cosϕ −sinϕ sinϕ cosϕ (−π ϕ π) For the variable ϕ, the following formula holds:
which is a single-parameter transform group M . Assuming x 0 is a point on M , its tangent vector at point x 0 is
The arc-length function is
and we define the energy function µ(t) in the path.
The network is a virtual space that supports various types of services and tasks. In the network, network objects consist of various software, hardware devices and information processes that support services and tasks. The network effectively measures the security of the network [30] . There are objective and subjective measurements in the network. An objective measurement usually refers to the measurement tool used to gain some quantitative index values. A subjective measurement can be a rough judgment given by artificial perception. However, the variable can be used to determine the algebraic relationships of semantic descriptions to achieve quantification.
2) NETWORK BEHAVIOR
In the network, information gathering, transmission, processing, storage and sharing make up the network behavior [30] .
The network behavior is a series of steps in a network system with a certain function and meaning. Attack behavior and defensive behavior are network behaviors. The behavior in figure 4 is an attack behavior, which includes the start node and end node. There are many nodes between them, such as the firewall, router, and switch.
3) ATTACK ENERGY
In the network behavior, the energy of the impact of attack behavior in the network is represented by the symbol E in .
4) DEFENSIVE POWER
During network defensive behavior, the resist energy metric in the network is represented by the symbol E out .
5) NETWORK FLOW DIAGRAM
In the network, there is always a host connection packet. These sent packets can be regarded as the connection relationship between the hosts. Because it has a relationship between the flow in the network, it is called the network flow diagram.
Network behavior is an integral part of the network and is also a step toward realizing the powers of the network. Through network behavior, users can do what they want to do. Traces on the network are the network behavior paths, including malicious behavior or normal behavior. The state of the network also changes from a safe state to an unsafe state. The impact on the network can be viewed as an attack in the behavior process. Aggressive and defensive behavior may occur simultaneously. These two behaviors are superimposed on each other. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between these two behaviors.
The descriptions of the definitions include a basic notational model for the network and behaviors. Next, this paper uses mathematical methods to build models for networks.
D. LIE GROUP CONSTRUCTION OF THE NETWORK SYSTEM
A matrix composed of indicators and topologies in the network is mapped to the Lie group. Three steps are required to prove that the network can be represented as a Lie group. First, we form a matrix of indicators and topologies in the network. Second, we prove that the matrix and operations of the matrix are general linear groups. Finally, according to the theorem, the general linear group is a Lie group.
1) FORM A MATRIX OF INDICATORS AND TOPOLOGIES IN
A network is mainly composed of various devices and connection relationships between devices. These devices connect to each other by calling relationships. At every moment, the network is in a specific state. Thus, the network system collects various indicators over time (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n ) to form a state transition and a point in the state space. Each indicator x i is the input to the function. All possible values form a state space. In the formula 1, the analytical function y = f (x) represents the state of the current network calculated by the indicator, which is a measure containing objective quantities. For subjective quantities, it is easy to determine that using algebra to represent and insert these quantities into the formula will be helpful in this modeling task. Next, the objective quantity is modeled where f i is parsed for a i and x i , x i is a variable, a i is a parameter, (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) represents a point in n-dimensional space, and variables are taken from real values.
In an algebraic expression, formula 1 can also be written as formula 2.
where A represents the motion matrix formed by the constant and x represents the matrix composed of the indicator variables.
2) MATRIX AND MATRIX OPERATIONS ARE GENERAL LINEAR GROUPS
Definition 2 general linear group: Given a ring R with identity, the general linear group GL(n, R) is the group of n×n invertible matrices with elements in R. The general linear group GL(n, R) is the set of n × n matrices with entries that have nonzero determinants.
The network flow diagram is n × n matrices. Each element in the matrix is in the subset of ring R. There are many indicators in the network system, and it is certain that two indicators are irrelevant, which shows that the matrix is a nonzero determinant. Thus, the network system matrix and multiplication between the matrix is a general linear group.
3) A GENERAL LINEAR GROUP IS A LIE GROUP
Theorem 1 A general linear group is a Lie group:
The part of the product operation in the matrix group is a multivariate polynomial of the variable. Therefore, it is smooth, which shows that GL(n, R) is the Lie group.
According to theorem 1, it is easy to know that a nonsingular real square matrix combined with a matrix multiplication operation makes up a general linear group, that is, a Lie group [32] . The state of the network can be used to describe the matrix when using the formula 2. The transformation between the matrices makes up a matrix group. Thus, we obtain the Lie group structure.
A Lie group structure of the time and space dimension reflects the network. Formula 2 is derived to gain a derivative for x, and since the conductance must be continuous, the linear group is continuous. In the time dimension, the transition to two moments is continuous. The derivative for time is: dy dt = A dx dt In the spatial dimension, the change from one state to another in the system is also continuous, and the corresponding derivative is:
However, in general, a d-dimensional manifold M d is not a vector space. The metric on the manifold is also not in the Euclidean space. Therefore, the distance from the Lie group cannot be directly calculated. It needs to be measured by the geodesic distance. From the unit element, there is a unique geodesic distance from the direction in the tangent space.
The local Euclidean transformation is the characteristic of the transform of the Lie group. Indicators are collected in Euclidean space, which transforms the map to higher dimensions by defining a smooth mapping function. This function is a mapping relationship between the Euclidean space and the state space. Additionally, the motion state can be represented by a matrix. The state change is the direction along the tangent vector in space. Thus, the transformed value of the distance between the state change can be calculated. Because the smooth manifold cannot directly calculate the distance, the distance must be defined as follows.
E. LIE GROUP DISTANCE DEFINITION
A point named in the constructed state manifold has a neighborhood U a , and T a (M ) indicates that M is at the cut space of point a. If x : U − > R D is the coordinate system at point a and (
) is the direction vector for x i at point a, then the inner product g i,j =<
> is a differentiable function on U. The tangent space is an n-dimensional matrix. Thus, the left invariant metric can be used to define the Riemann metric [33] in formula 3. The inner product calculation formula is given as follows:
The submanifold on the general linear group is GL(n, R). The manifold formed by the whole positive definite matrix is represented as PD(n). The geodesic distance connecting point A and point B is expressed as the formula 4:
The geodesic distance between two points of PD(n) connected to point A and point B is expressed as a formula by the inner product function in formula 5:
Then, the distance between point A and point B on PD(n) is [34] d(A, B) = || log(A) − log(B)|| (7) For the Riemannian manifold after the Lie group transformation, there is the following distance approximation:
Among them, y a ij and y b ij are the values of point a and point b, respectively, in the Lie group structure.
The distance formula can be used to characterize the distance between the Riemannian manifold when the attack occurs to the flow diagram. The flow diagram is represented by the form of the adjacency matrix according to the attack sequence and the attack path. If the two devices have a flow characteristic change in the attack process, it is represented by 1; otherwise, it is represented by 0. Based on the adjacency matrix of the flow diagram, the distance formula can be written as formula 8:
In the cyberattack diagram, point a with point b can represent different status points. A Lie group can be constructed in different dimensions of space and time. The distance between states can be calculated by the specific network indicator. In the space dimension, network behavior occurs to the network hosts. The risk of network intrusion will spread along the connectivity between the hosts. The formula 8 can be used to calculate the range of risk propagation along the network topology. The relationships between the hosts are calculated to measure the spread of risk. In the time dimension, the change in the index directs the network motion. The risk always spreads toward rapid change.
F. NETWORK ATTACK AND DEFENSE UTILITY CALCULATION BASED ON A LIE GROUP
The types of networks mentioned above have considerable differences in specific network characteristics. The indicators VOLUME 7, 2019 for measurement are not the same. However, there is a likeness in the topology, which satisfies the form of the connected graph G = (V , E). The behavior in the network occurs along the path formed between the points. According to the network topology and network behavior, the Lie group method can calculate the length of the path in high-dimensional space and the utility integral to the path.
Common types of attacks are as follows: DDoS attacks, worm attacks, amplification attacks, link flood attacks, mobile botnets and wormhole attacks. All attacks can be viewed as a series of ordered instructions. These instructions may exist on nodes of the same network system or on multiple nodes. By combining instructions, a complete network attack is formed and can be represented by an ordered set.
Based on the Lie group method, this paper establishes a Riemann metric space in which the quantification of attack and defense effects can be established.
In the document [35] , a method for evaluating network assets is given. In this paper, using information from the literature [35] , the following formula for attack and defense utility is obtained.
In formula (9), µ(x) indicates the utility function of the attack and defense of the system. The utility function refers to the impact of attacks and defensive behaviors on the network. The utility metric comes from two parts. The first part is the risk from the outside, called the attack energy, which is also the source of the risk hazard, expressed by E in . The second part is the system's defense against attacks, called the defensive work, which can improve the security of the system and is represented by E out . The results of the effectiveness of the attack and defense are the results of the risk changes. The utility index of attack and defense becomes larger when the attack energy increases. The risk of the network increases at the same time, so the network risk and the attack are positively correlated. The attack and defense utility index decreases if the defensive power increases, and the network risk also decreases. Thus, defensive power and network risk are negatively correlated. The network's attack and defense effects can be used to assess the network risks. The reference by which to evaluate vulnerabilities is [35] . Attack energy is defined as follows:
In formula 10, an attack can consist of three parameters: l for the damage caused by the attack, v for the level of the attack, and t for the probability of exploiting the vulnerability.
In formula 11, the defense function has a similar defense type against the defense and the defense power.
As shown in table 2, we can describe the network attack with the Lie group. The overall steps of the algorithm are as follows: 1) Obtain the observational indicators of each host;
2) The row vector V = x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n is constructed based on the indicator; 3) Calculate the tangent direction of the row vector, use the principal component analysis (PCA) algorithm, and measure the state of the host with a unique value, Index =< V , V >; 4) Form a weight map G of the network according to the network system connection relationship and the weight of the link; 5) Construct a matrix A(i, j) for the pairwise comparison of indicators, such as through formula 12. The diagonal measure of the matrix represents the risk metric of the node, and the index on the off-diagonal line indicates the risk on the link between the nodes; 6) Construct a point-multiplicative norm of the weight map and the indicator matrix, that is, calculate the value of the square matrix determinant after multiplying the two matrix points, D = ||G. * A||; 7) Calculate the value of the attack and defense functions using formula 10 and formula 11 and calculate the value of the utility function using formula 9; 8) Calculate the risk metric using formula 13 so that the risk comes from the internal cause of external attacks and internal defense resistance, as well as the external performance of the observed data.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This paper provides a method for calculating the risk value of the attack and defense of a network based on a Lie group. The model evaluates the risk value from a single device service to all network devices and from the local to the overall network region.
Locally, devices such as hosts, routers, switches, servers and terminal devices in the network space can be regarded as network nodes. The information on services for these devices can be regarded as neighboring points. Similar collected indicators are regarded as indicators of the network status by marking the state of each moment of the network. These indicators are used to map the state in cyberspace to a point in the Lie group using the mapping function.
Overall, network attack and defense processes are sequences of node services. During attack and defense processes, the state of the node on the attack path changes. The result of the change is the security risk of the overall network system. We calculated the attack behavior according to the amount of change in the offense and defense processes. The change in the overall risk value can be calculated by the distance between the points and the integral of the utility function.
The flow chart in figure 5 of the network system risk measurement method based on a Lie group specifically includes the following steps.
A. QUANTITATIVE COLLECTION OF INDICATORS
The metrics in this paper cover the availability, connectivity, and reliability of the network and measure the overall risk. The indicators selected in this example are shown in table 4. For the availability indicator of the network, we select the device key metric central processing unit (CPU) usage values, memory usage values, disk occupancy values and system load values in [36] . For devices such as routers and switches in the network, some indicators are selected for the availability measurement. For the network connectivity, the running status of the network system, including the flow, bandwidth, port flow, and average to flow, are measured. For each device in the network, the connectivity measurement is performed from indicators such as the open port value, peak traffic, broadband use value, node connectivity value and average traffic. For network reliability, application vulnerabilities and system vulnerabilities are applied in the network for measurement. The indicator items selected in this article can be expanded and can be increased according to different devices. These items reflect the reliability, availability, and connectivity of the network. The specified tool should be used to collect the indicator to gain the indicator value of each time of each device. The tools are the performance monitor, Nessus and system commands. After the data collection is completed, the data are quantified. The uncollected index value is replaced by 0 in [37] when a device has only some index values. This article considers not only the equipment but also the internal information, such as services and vulnerabilities, of the equipment.
B. MAP THE NETWORK SYSTEM TO A LIE GROUP STRUCTURE
The Lie group is a group structure that can be used to characterize continuous and smooth cyberspace state transitions. Each device in the network system is a point in the manifold space formed by a Lie group transformation. The indicator change value of the device is the value of the point of the manifold corresponding to the device.
The indicator value of each device should be extracted from the network system X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , . . . , x m }, where m is the total number of indicators in step 1. The extracted value is then subtracted from the initial value of the corresponding indicator to obtain the change value of the index relative to the initial value X = x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , . . . , x m , among which x m = x m − x m0 , x m0 , where x m represents the value of the mth indicator at the initial moment. Then, using formula 12, a low-dimensional (m-dimensional) Euclidean space can be converted into a high-dimensional (m 2 -m-dimensional) Riemannian manifold. That is, the value of the point of the Lie group corresponding to the device is A(i, j) , i, j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , m. After the various equipment indicators in the network system are transformed by the Lie group, the dimension greatly increases. The calculation of the index is different from the initial value. The difference can be expressed as the distance between the Euclidean spaces. The above transformation process is an equidistant transformation. The equidistant transformation is a Lie group transformation, so the process of determining the difference and performing the smooth mapping above is the process of Lie group transformation. Through the above-described Lie group transformation, to calculate the distance between points on the Lie group, we need to construct the Riemann distance function.
C. CALCULATE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN NODES IN THE MANIFOLD SPACE OF THE LIE GROUP MAP
The attack is the path of the flow diagram in the network. In the space formed by the Lie group transformation, the collected indicators can describe the risk of the equipment. The state between adjacent devices is changed due to an attack. The Lie group transformation is the change in the distance between the manifold spaces. Distance is a variable that describes a change in risk. In this paper, the utility of the attack and defense in an atomic attack is mainly focused on the attack process. In this process, the service links one device to another. An attack sequence can be constructed from all attacked devices. Finally, the integral summary calculation is performed for the overall attack sequence to obtain the risk value of the overall attack and defense processes.
D. UTILITY CALCULATION
The integral of the state change in the network at different times and spaces is the utility of the network attack behavior. The internal cause of the attack and defense comes from the game results of the attack energy and defensive power. The sizes of the two are directly calculated for the utility function.
E. RISK METRIC
From formula 13 in the previous section, the measure of risk is mainly derived from the results of the attack and defensive games. The risk value is always nonnegative. The risk value of the safety state is 0, and the risk value means the distance between the safety state and others. The larger the value is, the greater the risk.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION
To corroborate the truth and rationality of the model, this paper sets up a unified network environment and initially sets the security level of the network. Then, the Lie group assessment method is used to measure the risk. The purpose is to describe the process of the experiment and to explain the correctness of the theory. Based on verifying our own experiments, this article will also use public datasets to confirm and increase the persuasiveness.
A. DDOS ATTACK
In figure 3 , the network system contains the basic devices in a network system, such as routers, hosts, and firewalls, with a topology and implements connectivity between devices. Then, an attack is launched from outside the system. A DDoS attack [38] is a denial of service attack that affects the server's memory, CPU, and flow. This paper takes similar indicators for measurements. Hackers attack servers in a network system and go through firewalls (id=1), routers (id=2), switches (id=3), servers (id=4), etc. A complete path is shown in figure 4 . These devices are presented as points on the path segment. The line is the link with the device representing the path of the attack and defense formed by the cyberattack behavior. The server (id = 4) can be measured using three indicators (memory, CPU, and flow). Then, the server's indicator constitutes V 4 = {memory, cpu, flow} without an attack, and the values of the three parameters are
The initial index vector is subtracted from the current index vector to obtain the change amount:
After normalization, the largest indicator is selected as the direction of the change. The largest change in the above formula is flowing. The flow replaces the risk of the current hosts.
Similarly, we can calculate the indicator of the host and the indicator for the link between the host. We can obtain a matrix of observation indicators: 
In the above equations, D is the dot product of the weight matrix and the indicator observation matrix. D's topologically invariant value can be used to represent D, such as the value of D's determinant or trace. The source of risk comes from not only observational data but also utility functions. Thus, the risk value can be measured by multiplying the utility function and D. Because the utility function is complicated, this paper does not expand the function or the constant function used to represent it.
The original data are shown in figure 6 . The two coordinates at the bottom of the figure show that there are 20 indicators and 60 records. We cannot directly observe the DDoS attack from this figure. The figure has no obvious features. Thus, we use a Lie group to represent the network system. The integration of the indicators is shown in figure 7 . In the figure, there is a peak and a trough representing the features of the attack. Thus, we can identify the attack. The result is shown in figure 8 . Clearly, the value of the network risk is low at first. With increasing attack strength and attack performance, the risk value of the network increases at the same time. The DDoS attack of the network will affect the state information on the host. The following public dataset measures network security by collecting the flow information of the network.
B. CIC2017 [39] VERIFICATION
The Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017) contains 25 users based on HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH and e-mail protocols. The data-capturing period started at 9 a.m. on Monday, July 3, 2017, and ended at 5 p.m. on Friday, July 7, 2017, lasting 5 days. Monday is a normal day and includes only benign flow. The fulfilled attacks include brute force FTP, brute force SSH, DoS, Heartbleed, web attack, infiltration, botnet and DDoS. These attacks were executed in both the morning and afternoon on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. CIC IDS2017 was evaluated and introduced. It was compared with other datasets such as KDD99 and Defcon in reference [40] .
According to the introduction to the dataset, there are 12 hosts of the internal network of the dataset, including two servers. It also includes a DNS server and a firewall. The attack network consists of 4 hosts. The host information is shown in table 5. A number indicates a host. Two ip addresses on a line show that the host has two ip addresses, an external network ip and an internal network ip. The first four hosts are the hosts used by the attacker and belong outside the network. From a time perspective, the network did not receive an attack on Monday. As a reference, the DDoS attack is shown in table 6. 2) Network system topology mapping to the Lie group structure Through the observed data, the connectivity between nodes can be characterized. The topological relationship is shown in figure 9 . According to the connection relationship between the nodes, the adjacency matrix G is constructed. The risk value of a single node is calculated according to the formula. The dataset is the data connectivity between nodes, not the indicators of individual nodes. The diagonal line of matrix G is the observation value of the corresponding node; therefore, it is 0, which shows that there is a connection between the two hosts when an element is 1 in the matrix. The matrix represents 15 hosts, and the matrix has 15 rows and 15 columns. The matching value is calculated by formula 8. For example, the selected time is 4:05 for comparison. The observation data of the ip were from 172.16.0.1 to 192.168.10.50. The number of observation data transmissions was 4,155 for port 80. On Monday, the number of visits to port 80 was only 2 at 9:00. The number of visits varied and was the highest when compared with the others. Thus, the direction of the tangent vector was along the direction of the flow change. The number of changes was used to measure the observations of these two nodes. Assume that the subscript of 172.16.0.1 was i and that the subscript of 192.168.10.50 was j. As shown in the following formula, the calculated value can be large:
The result can be considered infinite or be below the normal range. We calculated matrix A by utilizing the relationship between all nodes. All the data were reduced 10,000 times because the calculated value was too large to display. (14) and (15), as shown at the bottom of the next page. 
Therefore, the current network risk value is 1924, and there is a high risk.
C. RESULTS
Through the above examples, it can be seen that it is easy to calculate the risk value of the network system at a given time. Ultimately, the risk calculation results from all DoS/DDoS attacks are shown in table 7. The score is higher, and the risk is greater. There is a risk where the scores are 500 points or more. The risk value is minimal where the user is active. The following measured data show that the situation is too large to compare with the value of the users' normal activities. Therefore, the risk is also the largest. When the computer is attacked, the risk value of the network is higher than that from normal activities.
Some risk scores, such as those of SSH patator, DoS Slowloris and bot, were below 500. The score of the portscan was 0. No risk was detected because the characteristics of aggressive behavior are not obvious. In addition, the bot, XSS attacks and SQL injection attacks had lower scores and could not significantly be detected because of the flaws in the CIC2017 collection, which contains only the traffic characteristics between the network host and does not include the risk characteristics of the host, such as application security indicators, web service security, system security and other indicators. However, the indicators for the host can also implement the network metrics of the hosts and network in our algorithm. Table 8 shows the performance examination results from the seven selected common machine learning algorithms. The data are from Lashkari's paper.
We used three common information retrieval evaluation metrics, namely, precision (Pr), recall (Rc) and F-Measure (F1). We observed the execution time and the three evaluation metrics (Pr, Rc, and F1). The highest-accuracy algorithms are the k-nearest neighbors (KNN), random forest (RF) and iterative dichotomiser 3 (ID3) algorithms. Our algorithm is at a medium level compared with the others for the three indicators and execution time. As a new metric method, there are many details to optimize.
The Lie group metric method is at a medium level compared with common machine learning algorithms. The Pr, Rc and F1 were all 0.83. Our algorithm performed worse than did the KNN algorithm. The KNN and other models use specific metrics. We used all the indicators, which contain more errors. Lashkari optimized these methods, for example, focusing on the number of indicators, the number of types of KNN classification, and the weights of indicators. Our algorithm execution speed was 20 seconds. Our time complexity is O(n), and the time complexity of the KNN is higher than O(n 2 ). Our algorithms are suitable for distributed computing to increase the computational speed. In addition, the performance of the test machine also has a certain effect on the speed. As a new risk assessment method, the Lie group metric algorithm also needs to be optimized. However, the network is mapped into the mathematical model using the Lie group. The calculation is more objective and reasonable compared to related methods.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a risk metric model based on a Lie group of cyberspace systems. In the model, the internal factors of attack and defense are used to measure the security of the risk of static scenarios. The risk of attacks and defenses along with the external performance are used to measure the risk of the dynamic scenario. Experiments are verified for different attacks. The advantage of this model is that it can measure dynamic and static scenes. It is measured in conjunction with external and internal risk factors.
In this paper, we can draw the following conclusions:
1) It is feasible to apply a Lie group to calculate the risk value. The indicators and topologies of the network system can form a matrix. The matrix can be expressed as a Lie group. 2) The experimental results show that a Lie group has obvious effects on the types of attacks whose indicators are continuously changing, such as DDoS. If the indicator is discrete, the effect is less obvious, such as a port scan. 3) In a Lie group calculation process, a Lie group combined with the utility function can calculate the energy of the attacker and the energy of the defender.
There are many possible future works.
(1) We describe the relationship between the attacker and defender by using a constant function. Actually, it would be better to use more complicated functions. (2) The experimental data on CIC2017 are idealized in the paper. Many experiments, such as tests on the KDD99 and Defcon datasets, are needed for further proof to ensure the universality of the algorithm. (3) We can use machine learning to determine the weights of nodes and indicators to improve the accuracy of our algorithm.
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